Events | Prof. Heinzelmann
NEXT EVENT
"Decomposing motivation"
by Philippe Tobler (Neuroscience, University of Zürich)
| 20 December 2024, 2pm-4.15pm |
Location: Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
Note that talks but not Q&A may be recorded.
Humans and other animals approach reward and avoid punishment and pay attention to cues predicting these events. Such motivated behavior thus appears to be guided by value, which directs behavior towards or away from positively or negatively valenced outcomes. Moreover, it is facilitated by (top-down) salience, which enhances attention to behaviorally relevant learned cues predicting the occurrence of valenced outcomes. Using human neuroimaging, we recently separated value (ventral striatum, posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex) from salience (anterior ventromedial cortex, occipital cortex) in the domain of liquid reward and punishment. Moreover, we investigated potential drivers of learned salience: the probability and uncertainty with which valenced and non-valenced outcomes occur. We find that the brain dissociates valenced from non-valenced probability and uncertainty, which indicates that reinforcement matters for the brain, in addition to information provided by probability and uncertainty alone, regardless of valence. Finally, we assessed learning signals (unsigned prediction errors) that may underpin the acquisition of salience. Particularly the insula appears to be central for this function, encoding a subjective salience prediction error, similarly at the time of positively and negatively valenced outcomes. However, it appears to employ domain-specific time constants, leading to stronger salience signals in the aversive than the appetitive domain at the time of cues. These findings explain why previous research associated the insula with both valence-independent salience processing and with preferential encoding of the aversive domain. More generally, the distinction of value and salience appears to provide a useful framework for capturing the neural basis of motivated behavior.
About Philippe Tobler:
https://www.econ.uzh.ch/en/people/faculty/tobler.html
FURTHER EVENTS OF THE WINTER TERM 2024/25
February 2024
"N. N."
by Daniel Schunk (Economics, Mainz)
| 7 February 2025, 2pm-4.15pm |
Location: Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
Note that talks (but not Q+A) may be recorded
January 2024
"N. N."
by Christian Kietzmann (Philosophy, Leipzig)
| 31 January 2025, 2pm-4.15pm |
Location: Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
Note that talks (but not Q+A) may be recorded
"N. N."
by Kellie Owens (Population Health, New York University)
| 24 January 2025, 3pm-4.15pm |
Screening in Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
Note that talks (but not Q+A) may be recorded
"What does it mean to be healthy? It’s complicated …"
by Pascale Willemsen (Philosophy, University of Zürich)
| 17 January 2025, 2pm-4.15 pm |
Location: Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
Note that talks (but not Q+A) may be recorded
What does it mean for an organism to be healthy? Over the past five decades, philosophers of medicine and medical professionals have engaged in considerable debate regarding the definition of “health.” Traditionally, there have been two main positions: 1.) negativism, which defines health as the absence of disease; and 2.) positivism claims that health is the presence of some additional positive state or ability. It has been pointed out that the debate has reached somewhat of a stalemate and that there has been little to no progress with traditional philosophical methods, such as conceptual analysis, explicature, and the method of cases. In addition, the concept of health might be in flux and subject to change, and different groups of speakers may mean different things when they call someone or something healthy. In reaction to the methodological challenge, some scholars have suggested supplementing our traditional toolkit with empirical methods to make progress. Some first empirical investigations already suggest that the term health is strongly associated with leading a healthy lifestyle – an understanding that is orthogonal to both negativism and positivism.
In this talk, I present a systematic, experimental investigation into the folk concept of health. Data from four experimental studies suggest that neither negativism nor positivism is correct – and also the newly-established lifestyle view does not get it entirely right. Instead, the folk concept of health seems to have multiple senses, one of which is related to the absence of diseases, the other to leading a healthy lifestyle. What unites these different senses is that “being healthy” is not an objective fact, but a highly evaluative judgment. These findings challenge traditional definitions of health and raise a series of practical issues: How can we make sure that philosophers of medicine, medical professionals and ordinary people speak the same language when they talk about health?
December 2024
"A Method for Philosophy: AI Philosophy"
by Vincent C. Müller (Philosophy, FAU Erlangen Nürnberg)
with Guido Löhr (FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg)
| 13 December 2024, 2pm-4.15pm |
Location: Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
Note that talks but not Q&A may be recorded.
On the background of the general problem of philosophical methodology, we identify a new tool for the philosophical toolbox: AI. We propose that not only can AI learn from philosophy, but philosophy can learn from AI, too: It is both ways. This applies particularly to conceptual analysis, which can be advanced by asking what would be required for an AI system to fall under the concept we are discussing; call this “AI Philosophy”. This method would allow progress in the philosophy of AI, rather than mere application, and in general philosophy it avoids anthropocentrism, and gives us access to a testable environment for our philosophical argumentation. Given the wide range of features we can consider for AI systems, this method allows us to cover a wide range of philosophical issues, especially in the philosophy of mind, language, epistemology, and ethics.
About Vincent C. Müller:
November 2024
"Emerging Biotechnologies & Ethics"
An interdisciplinary Conference with Perspectives from Sciences and Humanities
| 28-30 November 2024 |
Location: Neue Universität (28 Nov) and Marsilius Kolleg (29/30 Nov)
More information and registration: Marsilius Kolleg
The workshop seeks to foster an interdisciplinary dialogue between life sciences researchers and scholars engaged in ethical, philosophical, and social reflection on these advancements. It is a joint venture between the Institute for Molecular Systems Engineering and Advanced Materials (IMSEAM), the Max Planck Institute for Medical Research (MPImR), and the Marsilius-Kolleg.
The event will open with a public panel discussion at the Neue Aula of Heidelberg University on Thursday (November 28th) on the topic of brain organoids, followed by two days of talks and in-depth discussions.
The majority of speakers will be drawn from Heidelberg University and its renowned local research institutions, including the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), the National Center for Tumor Diseases (NCT), and Heidelberg University Hospital as well as the IMSEAM and the MPImR themselves. The workshop will also feature S. Matthew Liao, Arthur Zitrin Professor of Bioethics at the School of Global Public Health at New York University (NYU), as the keynote speaker, adding an internationally recognized voice to the ethical debates surrounding emerging biotechnologies.
Any further questions can be directed to:
nils.schuetz@ts.uni-heidelberg.de
On behalf of the organization team
Nils Schütz
"Gender differences in career-related decision making–biases we need to cure, or rational behavior?"
by Christiane Schwieren (Economics, Heidelberg)
| 22 November 2024, 2pm-4.15pm |
Location: Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
Note that talks but not Q&A may be recorded.
About Christiane Schwieren:
"Neutral by choice"
by Verena Wagner (Philosophy, Humboldt University, Berlin)
with Yulia Oganian (Tübingen) and Christoph Korn (Heidelberg)
| 15. November 2024, 2 pm--4.15 pm |
Location: Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
Cognitive Neuroscience meets Philosophy of Mind - The general aim of the project is to provide an empirically informed theory of cognitive neutrality which can account for distinct mental phenomena such as mere indecision and various forms of suspension of judgement. States of neutrality are systematically underrepresented in contemporary philosophical theories as well as in cognitive neuroscience. In both cases, neglecting their existence is the result of reducing the complexity of decision-making. In experimental approaches, neutral outcomes are standardly avoided by using the method of forced choice alternatives. This project is an attempt to bring the lost complexity back and gain a more naturalistic understanding of decision-making, which includes the option of being neutral by choice. We will start with a provisional philosophical framework that describes various intuitive forms of cognitive neutrality. This framework will be translated into empirically assessable parameters, and we will develop new methods for measuring different forms of abstention in two central human decision-making settings: sensory perception and human cooperation scenarios. Based on the resulting empirical insights, the philosophical framework will be continuously revised and refined.
Committing to Indecision - A Taxonomy of Suspension of Judgment:
The talk will refer to this paper. It is recommended to read the paper, especially pages 1-4 and pages 7-12.
Note that talks but not Q&A may be recorded.
About Verena Wagner:
Prof. Dr. Verena Wagner is a Professor of Philosophy of Mind at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and the Berlin School of Mind and Brain. Her research explores the intersection of philosophy of mind and epistemology, focusing on cognitive neutrality, mental states, and inquiry. Her work has been published in prominent journals, including Philosophical Studies.
"Reflective Equilibration Solves The Paradox of Diachronic AI Safety"
by Gregor Betz (Philosophy, KIT, Karlsruhe)
| 8 November 2024, 2pm-4.15pm |
Location: Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
The dynamic nature of our factual knowledge of, and our normative outlook on the world give rise to two conflicting safety requirements of advanced AI systems: (i) adaptability and (ii) resilience. The case for adaptability is straightforward: Safe AI systems must be able to learn novel facts and correct outdated or erroneous beliefs: acting on false information is likely to lead to bad outcomes. In addition, it’s an important safety feature that AI systems be able to continuously learn from human feedback, e.g. by adjusting the way they interpret and apply general principles of helpfulness or harm avoidance. The case for resilience seems, however, equally strong: It would be highly problematic for AI systems to autonomously modify, or even entirely drop basic normative tenets they have been initially designed to follow. Moreover and more specifically, safe AI systems must be able to resist manipulation attempts such as adversarial model editing or malicious prompt hacking, which typically try to "fool" the model into accepting presumably novel facts. I will argue that this paradoxical situation, where safety requirements pull in opposite directions, can be eased by stipulating that dynamic AI learning be guided by reason. To this end, I present and discuss two computational studies on rational belief revision of LLMs through reflective equilibration.
Note that talks but not Q&A may be recorded.
About Gregor Betz:
* Betz G, K Richardson 2023. Probabilistic coherence, logical consistency, and Bayesian learning: Neural language models as epistemic agents. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281372
Oktober 2024
"Preimplantation polygenic testing: a comeback of determinism and eugenics?"
by Alejandra Petino Zappala (German Cancer Research Center, Heidelberg)
| 25 Oktober 2024, 2pm-4.15pm |
Location:Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Hybrid event - join here
Since the Human Genome Project, the role of genetic information in our lives has changed dramatically. Genetic testing, originally used to detect or prevent congenital, often deadly or incapacitating diseases, has shifted to the management of risk for common adult conditions in the general population, and even to health optimization. Polygenic genetic testing, now available to clients via the Direct-To-Consumer (DTC) market, promises to estimate traits like weight or physical endurance, or the risk of complex conditions like diabetes or hypercholesterolemia. As these traits are affected by the interaction of several genomic variants and environmental factors, companies offering these tests promise to guide consumers toward a healthier lifestyle tailored to their genome. These genomic technologies have recently expanded to the assessment of embryos in the context of In Vitro Fertilization with the launch of preimplantation polygenic testing (PGT-P). PGT-P companies promise parents undergoing fertility treatments to use their embryos’ genomic information to predict their risk of developing common, multifactorial diseases like diabetes or psychiatric disorders in adulthood. This information results in a ‘ranking’ of the embryos, to help prioritize the “best” for transfer and obtaining “the healthiest child possible”. Moreover, these companies have raised the possibility of offering predictions on IQ, height, or skin color in the future if such tests become socially acceptable. In this talk, I will show that, despite being based on the same technology as the DTC tests offered to adults, the discourse of the companies offering PGT-P downplays the importance of the environment and one’s own agency in health outcomes. This marks a return to genetic determinism, previously relaxed by the ideas of agency and risk management typical of neoliberal biopolitics. I will also argue that the discourse on PGT-P has reinvigorated eugenicist ideas in the public sphere. These dynamics are sustained by an unwarranted expansion of the concept of ‘eugenics’, coupled with misleading analogies between embryo selection and individual or public health interventions, such as vaccination or sanitation. As a result, the idea of embryo selection is first equated to other kinds of reproductive or life choices and then presented as an ethical obligation both for parents and the whole of society.
About Alejandra Petino Zappala:
https://www.life-science-lab.org/cms/index.php/1649.html
"Coherence and Incoherence"
by Daniel Fogal (Philosophy, New York University)
with Olle Risberg (Uppsala)
| 22 Oktober 2024, 6-8pm c.t. |
Location: Hegelsaal, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
In the recent literature on coherence and structural rationality, it is widely assumed that sets of attitudes are coherent just in case they are not incoherent. In particular, the two most popular kinds of views of incoherence—those centered around wide scope rational requirements and those centered around guaranteed failures of some normatively significant kind—rely on this assumption. We argue that this assumption should be rejected because it fails to capture the difference between positively coherent attitudes and random unrelated ones. We also formulate and defend an alternative support-centric view of coherence and incoherence which captures this difference and has several additional advantages.
In case of interest (pre-read not required), the full draft is available here (under review; please treat confidentially)
About Daniel Fogal:
"Interventions to reduce the spread of misinformation: Two online experiments"
by Natalie Gold (Philosophy, London School of Economics, and Head of Trials, Verian)
| 18 Oktober 2024, 2pm-4.15pm |
Screening: at Room 117, Institute of Philosophy, Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Join remotely: here
Misinformation can have a profound detrimental impact on populations’ wellbeing. While previous experiments testing interventions have used perception- or intention-based outcome measures, in these two online experiments we presented participants with real-life misinformation posts in a social media platform simulation and measured their engagement, a more ecologically valid approach. The first is a large UK-based online experiment (n = 2430), where we assessed the performance of false tag and inoculation interventions in protecting against different forms of misinformation. Our pre-registered mixed-effects models indicated that both interventions reduced engagement with misinformation, but inoculation was most effective. The second is a pilot with n = 1000 Singaporean citizens and permanent residents, where we assessed the performance of two different inoculation interventions: a carousel and a video. We found that the carousel reduced positive reactions to misinformation posts, while the video increased discernment of disinformation (measured using the signal detection index d-prime).
About Natalie Gold:
